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MOVING TO AN ORAL ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM IN MEXICO: 
JURISPRUDENTIAL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE 
LAW, AND TRIAL ADVOCACY IMPLICATIONS 
Paul J. Zwier∗ 
Alexander Barney∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, Mexico passed a series of federal constitutional reforms requiring 
oral adversarial criminal trials. The reforms give Mexican states until 2016 to 
implement the shift from a written inquisitorial system to the new oral 
adversarial system.1 At the time of this writing, twenty-four states have 
implemented the changes to some degree, with varying degrees of success.2 
The reforms were motivated by both internal and external factors. The 
traditional inquisitorial system had grown cumbersome and inefficient, and it 
lacked transparency. The system was criticized by the international 
community, including in a 2002 report by the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights.3 Following that report, the United States and Mexico 
collaborated on a project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(called the Mexico Project) to advance President Vicente Fox’s justice reform 
proposals.4 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Director of International Advocacy and Dispute Resolution, and Director of the 
Advocacy Skills Program at Emory University School of Law. 
 ∗∗ First fellow with Emory Law School’s Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution. J.D., University 
of Southern California Gould School of Law (2008); B.A., Swarthmore College. In his position as Center 
Fellow, Barney has served as Project Coordinator for the Emory and Panamericana Universities’ Partnership to 
Establish a Mexican Institute for Trial Advocacy, a USAID-funded project. He was also a visiting professor at 
Panamericana University School of Law in Mexico City for the 2009 fall semester. He currently practices 
labor law at The Karmel Law Firm in Chicago. 
 1 Constitución Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 2 Oaxaca, Chihuahua, and Nuevo Leon had oral trials prior to the federal reforms. Miguel Sarre & Jan 
Perlin, Mexico, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 351, 352 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2007). 
 3 Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Civil and Political Rights, Including 
Questions of: Independence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity, 4–5, Econ. & Soc. Council, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/72/Add.1 (Jan. 24, 2002) (by Dato’Param Cumaraswamy).  
 4 See David A. Shirk & Alejandra Ríos Cázares, Introduction: Reforming the Administration of Justice 
in Mexico, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO 1, 35–38 (Wayne A. Cornelius & 
David A. Shirk eds., 2007). 
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Implementing the reforms is a major challenge for Mexico. Creating the 
new court system and training the judges and staff to manage that system will 
require an enormous investment of time and resources. The greatest challenge, 
however, may be in changing the perspective of the Mexican legal community. 
The Mexican legal system is based on a positivist philosophy that in some 
ways conflicts with the assumptions behind an oral adversarial system.5 For the 
reforms to work, Mexican judges and lawyers will need to challenge some of 
the assumptions of the positivist system. 
Mexico has looked to countries with oral adversarial traditions for help 
with the reforms, including the United States. The Authors have worked for the 
past three years on a partnership between Emory University School of Law and 
Universidad Panamericana in Mexico City. During that time, we have seen the 
challenges that the change in perspective poses for the reform. We have also 
seen how our own assumptions have limited the effectiveness of our training of 
Mexican judges and attorneys. 
To better understand the challenges to the reforms in Mexico, we begin 
with an examination of the jurisprudential debate between positivism and 
natural law. This Article attempts to explore what these two fundamentally 
contradictory legal and political views mean for Mexican lawyers in the 
context of the new constitutional amendments. In Part I, this Article explores 
the differences between Mexico’s positivism and the aspects of natural law 
inherent in an oral adversarial system. Specifically, it examines the influence 
of positivist legal philosopher Hans Kelsen on Mexico’s legal tradition and 
contrasts Kelsen’s perspective with that of the Scottish Common Sense School, 
the philosophy behind the United States’ common law system. 
In Part II, this Article looks at the major choices before the legislature 
regarding changes to criminal procedure and evidence,6 and what choices 
Mexico faces in incorporating international human rights law into its law of 
criminal procedure and evidence law.7 Most importantly, where will Mexico 
finally come down in its identity crisis over natural law and positivist law, as it 
 
 5 See H. Patrick Glenn, Doin’ the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions, 50 MCGILL L.J. 
863, 895–96 (describing the Mexican legal system as incompatible with the U.S. system because of the 
Mexican government’s doctrinally founded position); infra Part I. 
 6 Código Federal de Procedimientos Penales [CFPP] [Federal Criminal Procedure Code], as amended, 
DO, 30 de Agosto de 1934 (Mex.). 
 7 Mérida Pillar II: Rule of Law, USAID/MEX. USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/mx/ruleoflaweng.html 
(last visited May 5, 2012) (describing the Rule of Law initiative and Mexico’s incorporation of due process 
and international human rights). 
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moves to an oral adversarial system by due process of law?8 How much will 
the common law adversarial system of the Magna Carta become the foundation 
for its criminal procedure? What will Mexico do with illegal police conduct in 
the gathering of evidence? How will a prosecutor be held accountable in his or 
her preparation of the case and gathering of evidence? How much will the 
pretrial procedure try to filter out evidence that is obtained in violation of the 
human rights of the witnesses or parties involved? And how much of 
individual rights will be sacrificed as Mexico deals with the emergency of its 
drug war? 
In Part III, this Article examines objections raised from conference 
delegates and early participants in training programs alike about the overly 
emotional nature of oral advocacy.9 While these objections might grow out of 
the philosophical differences between positivism and natural law, they might 
also be grounded in cultural differences between the United States and Mexico. 
Moreover, much of the need for passionate advocacy in the United States is 
based on assumptions about what keeps jurors interested and helps them reach 
a just understanding of the facts in the case. If Mexico will not use a jury 
system, then the issue for reformers is how much the Mexican judiciary will 
similarly need passionate advocacy to discern the facts. The conference 
attendees reported resistance to the need for giving an opening statement, or 
conducting confrontational impeachment, or giving a stirring closing 
argument.10 They also were quite sure Mexican lawyers would not be 
permitted to appeal to underlying values, or use analogies to argue the 
inferences on closing.11 They were unsure about the need for exhibits in 
criminal cases, as the file already contained the prosecutor’s collection of 
evidence, and the use of pictures and exhibits were thought to be 
grandstanding.12 In addition, they were skeptical of making objections to the 
presentation of evidence because they were convinced their judges would not 
 
 8 Id.  
 9 Rule of Law Reform and the Drug Trade: Challenges and Implications in Mexico and the U.S., held by 
the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution, and the Institute for Developing Nations (Sept. 29–Oct. 1, 
2010) [hereinafter Rule of Law Reform and the Drug Trade.]. Video clips of remarks and panel discussions are 
available at Conference & Forum Video Archive, EMORY L., http://www.law.emory.edu/centers-clinics/center-
for-advocacy-dispute-resolution/conference-forum-video-archive.html (last visited May 5, 2012) [hereinafter 
Conference & Forum Video Archive].  
 10 See Rule of Law Reform and the Drug Trade, supra note 9. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See id. 
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understand hearsay or other evidence rules that prohibited them from 
considering character evidence.13 
This Article questions how the court—in its dual role as legal interpreter 
and as fact-finder—will provide for the system’s transparency and protect 
itself from bias. How will the court deal with the evidence issues raised by the 
change to an oral adversarial system? Will Mexican judges find it necessary 
for a new procedural law and evidence code to be able to justify to the public 
how the court is making its credibility determinations? Will these decisions 
give the public confidence that they are made in an unbiased manner? In this 
regard, how will the court interpret the new constitutional provisions with 
regard to any confrontation rights that are given to the defendant?14 Will the 
right, if any, to confrontation based on reliability considerations be applied 
only to the weight the judge will give testimony never confronted, or will it be 
seen as a fundamental constitutional right that makes the evidence inadmissible 
at trial? The Mexican reformers will need to decide these questions so that 
judges and lawyers, who will each play new roles in an oral adversarial system, 
know their respective duties under the law. Answers to these questions will 
also have major implications for the educational reform effort. 
Additionally in Part III, this Article looks at the rhetorical assumptions that 
underlie the principles of oral persuasion. These are examined to see whether 
there is enough agreement with these assumptions in Mexico to overcome the 
resistance to the techniques being taught. 
Finally, in Part IV, this Article explores the specific assumptions that 
underlie the oral presentation of evidence as it plays out in direct examinations, 
cross-examinations, impeachment, and the giving of opening statements and 
closing arguments. It considers whether the change to an oral adversarial 
system will affect the trial judge’s role as fact-finder. When the judge is the 
trier of fact, how will the court justify its fact-finding based on its view of the 
credibility of the witnesses? How will the court of appeals review the trial 
court’s decisions, and what evidence will it consider on appeal relating to 
credibility determinations? Will the Mexican system eventually need a jury, at 
least in criminal cases, if it is to deliver on its promises to bring transparency 
and the rule of law to the judicial process? An oral adversarial system limits 
 
 13 See id. 
 14 Carlos F. Natarén, Notes on Criminal Process and Constitutional Reform in Mexico Today, 4 MEX. L. 
REV. 99, 123 (2011). 
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judges’ freedoms to disguise their decisions in a blurring of fact-finding, legal 
interpretation, and sentencing. 
This Article hopes to provide guidance to rule of law reformers on both the 
U.S. and Mexican sides concerning the challenges that will arise during the 
design of curricula and training programs for implementing the new 
constitutional changes. In particular, reformers will need to build in discussion 
of the philosophical assumptions that underlie the change to an oral adversarial 
system. In addition, they will need to look at the role that judges will play as 
fact-finders in order to understand how lawyers will need to present and 
oppose the presentation of evidence in the most persuasive manner. As a result, 
Mexican reformers will better understand the decisions they must make as they 
try to maintain their unique cultural heritage, and at the same time, to make the 
necessary changes to bring transparency and accountability to their legal 
system. 
I. A CLASH OF JURISPRUDENCE 
One of the primary challenges of the Mexican reform is the clash between 
Mexico’s positivist legal system and the aspects of natural law inherent in the 
oral adversarial system. Positivism sees legal authority as being derived from 
the enactment of laws by the body politic, as opposed to existing prior to their 
enactment.15 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Mexico developed 
a secular-positivist legal system that was in part intended to limit the power of 
the Catholic Church.16 
Analyzing the forces behind the move of Mexican jurisprudence to a legal 
positivist system and the Mexican legal system’s experience with positivist 
principles provides a framework for examining Mexican legal history and the 
existing attitudes of the Mexican lawyers and judges the reformers will face in 
attempting to reform the system.17 As we will see, positivism contributed to a 
general disregard of the Mexican Constitution, as the courts, standing in for the 
state, saw a wide gap between the ideals of the constitution and the realities in 
 
 15 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 328–30 (Andres Wedberg trans., 1945) 
[hereinafter LAW AND STATE]. 
 16 Jorge A. Vargas, An Introductory Lesson to Mexican Law: From Constitutions and Codes to Legal 
Culture and NAFTA, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1337, 1337–72 (2004) (explaining that Spain saw Mexico and its 
indigenous people as its property and saw as its legal obligation to instill the religion of Catholicism in its 
people). See generally STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 1–42 (2004). 
 17 Stephen D. Morris, Mexico’s Political Culture: The Unrule of Law and Corruption as a Form of 
Resistance, 3 MEX. L. REV. 327 (2011). 
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individual communities.18 Positivism and general disregard of the constitution 
also led to a disregard of existing criminal law and criminal procedural 
statutes.19 Positivist jurisprudence and the realities in society faced by the 
courts contributed to a widely held view that the laws on the books could be set 
aside at the discretion of the police and the judges. 
The teachings of Hans Kelsen serve as a guide to the legal positivist 
framework adopted by Mexico, as he is widely seen as the patron saint of 
Mexican jurisprudence.20 In contrast, in the United States, the 
Enlightenment—and, in particular, Scottish common sense philosophy—
undergirds much of the country’s view of the common law and the role of the 
jury as fact-finder.21 By understanding these different philosophical bases, 
those participating in Mexico’s transition can more effectively communicate 
not only the differences in the system, but also the fundamental assumptions 
that undergird each option for change.22 The following Subparts address the 
competing philosophies in turn. 
A. Kelsen’s Positivism 
As one of the leading legal positivist theoreticians and international law 
scholars of the twentieth century, Hans Kelsen developed a “pure theory of 
law” that focused on the realistic and logical elements of law, while attacking 
metaphysical ideas such as justice and morality.23 These positivist ideas were 
being developed just in time to be included in the constitutional reforms 
Mexico was implementing in the late 1920s.24 
Kelsen’s pure theory of law equated law to a science that “has to describe 
its object as it actually is, not to prescribe how it should be or should not be 
 
 18 Elisa Speckman Guerra, Justice Reform and Legal Opinion: The Mexican Criminal Codes of 1871, 
1929, and 1931, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 225, 226. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Juan Abelardo Hernández Franco, Universidad Panamericana Sch. of Law, The Rule of Law: The 
Cultural Change in Legal Education in Mexico, Address at Emory University School of Law Conference: Rule 
of Law Reform and the Drug Trade: Challenges and Implications in Mexico and the U.S. (Sept. 30, 2010). The 
video clip is available at Conference & Forum Video Archive, supra note 9.  
 21 Susanna Blumenthal, The Mind of a Moral Agent: Scottish Common Sense and the Problem of 
Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century American Law, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 99, 120–22 (2008). 
 22 While our discussion has implications for any attempt to reform a civil system to a common law 
system, it is important to note the particular features of Mexico’s history, as our focus is on reform efforts in 
Mexico. 
 23 LAW AND STATE, supra note 15, at 124. 
 24 Speckman Guerra, supra note 18, at 239. 
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from the point of view of some specific value judgments.”25 Moreover, Kelsen 
served as one of the first scholars to explore the concept of the Grundnorm, a 
basic norm that provides the foundation for all other laws and institutions in 
any legal system.26 Rejecting a natural law or “image of God” understanding of 
human nature and human rights, Kelsen based foundations for law in strictly 
human reason and the social contract.27 His Grundnorm placed the ultimate 
authority of law in the legislative enactments of the state. Kelsen, who drafted 
an Austrian Constitution in 1920 that still forms the basis of Austrian 
constitutional law, advocated for a legal order that adhered to a hierarchical 
structure of norms.28 He reasoned that the constitution of a state should stand 
in the supreme position atop this hierarchical structure.29 In General Theory of 
Law and State, Kelsen described this tiered approach, writing that all legal 
norms are established on the validity of other, “higher” legal norms until the 
examination terminates at “the [Grundnorm] which, being the supreme reason 
of validity of the whole legal order, constitutes its unity.”30 Therefore, Kelsen 
based the validity of a state’s constitution on the existence of a valid 
Grundnorm within that state, and argued that this hierarchical structure gave 
legitimacy to subsequent acts by the state.31 In Kelsen’s view, a new act would 
only serve to modify existing law if a higher legal norm—such as the 
constitution of a state—conferred this power.32 According to Kelsen, only 
norms that belonged to a system or legal order could be considered legally 
valid, and this validity occurred through evidence that the relevant population 
had decided to follow the new law.33 
In his most famous writing, Kelsen developed a pure theory of law that 
examined the essential features of the law without considering external 
valuations or judgments.34 For example, Kelsen harshly criticized the concept 
of justice as an “irrational ideal.”35 In Kelsen’s legal positivist view, justice 
 
 25 LAW AND STATE, supra note 15, at xiv. 
 26 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 8 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (1934) 
[hereinafter PURE THEORY OF LAW]. 
 27 Id. at 18. 
 28 See LAW AND STATE, supra note 15, at 228. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 124. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 42. 
 34 See RONALD MOORE, LEGAL NORMS AND LEGAL SCIENCE: A CRITICAL STUDY OF KELSEN’S PURE 
THEORY OF LAW 8–14 (1978). 
 35 Id. at 10. 
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served as a value notion that determined what law “ought to be,” rather than 
what currently exists, and such a future-leaning examination should only 
proceed after deciphering the existing, necessary features.36 Aligning with 
Kelsen’s philosophy, legal positivism as a whole eliminated concepts such as 
justice and morality and instead adopted the view that every rule must be 
derived from a conscious act of legislation by a state.37 Scholars describe 
Kelsen’s pure theory as viewing a state as having a complete normative 
character with no existence separate from the law, and no identity beyond its 
uniformity with its own laws.38 
Important to Kelsen’s view of law is that law also exists through the acts of 
those empowered by the state to exercise authority. This presents a problem of 
what, if any, limits there might be to a court’s interpretation of any statute or 
constitution. Mexico reads Kelsen as “saying that those who are authorized to 
take any legal decision have the power freely to choose to either apply the law 
or to decide according to their personal discretion. The claim that the state 
cannot act illegally, hence, would be trivially true.”39 
 
 36 Id. at 9. 
 37 F.A. HAYEK, The Errors of Constructivism, in NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS 
AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 3, 15 (1978). 
 38 CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 5 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke Univ. Press 2008) 
(1928). 
 39 LARS VINX, HANS KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW 79 (2007). 
Public officials who claim to exercise powers conferred by legal order often appear to act in ways 
that we believe violate constraints of legality. Kelsen’s identity thesis, however, makes it 
impossible to describe such situations by saying that the state or those acting on its behalf violated 
the law. The only two possible descriptions of the situation, given the identity thesis, are the 
following: Either the fact that I believe an act of a public official to have been legally defective in 
some way or other must entitle me to conclude that the act, though taken by a person who holds 
public office, was null, not an act of state and therefore not binding, because it was, in my view, 
not perfectly legal. This first way of interpreting the identity thesis would, for obvious reasons, 
completely undermine the possibility of legal authority. 
The second option is the view that all decisions identifiable as decisions taken by public officials 
on the basis of some lesser standard than perfect legality are to be considered as legally valid, in 
virtue of having been taken by public officials, regardless of whether they conform in substance to 
all the laws they claim to apply. This second approach to the identity thesis, by contrast, fails to 
impose any constraints on the power of public officials to act as they see fit. The resulting position 
amounts to law-state dualism in effect, if not in name. 
The way in which Kelsen dealt with this problem in the Introduction to the Problems of Legal 
Theory strongly suggests that he adopted the second option by embracing what is called the 
doctrine of ‘normative alternatives.’ The doctrine of normative alternatives claims that norms on a 
higher level of the legal hierarchy provide not only for the validity of lower-level norms that 
conform in procedure and substance to the requirements of legality intended by the higher-level 
norms. They also provide for the validity of lower-level norms violating those intended 
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As a result of Kelsen’s theory of positivism, Mexican judges came to 
believe that they could be freed up from the constraints of constitutional 
provisions if they saw a greater need in the community that needed to be 
addressed.40 As taught today in Mexican law schools, “law” contains authority 
for judges to reach judicial decisions that do not follow the plain meaning of 
legislation or even the constitution.41 One of the hallmarks of Mexican lawyers 
is their understanding of and pride in Mexico’s legal framework after its war 
for independence from Spain. Mexican law students are taught that legal 
reformers during the revolution against Spain brought into being a new secular 
foundation of law. These reformers wanted a new jurisprudence that would 
place Mexican law in distinction from the Catholic natural law constructs of 
Spanish colonialism.42 Law and Catholicism were separated in order for a new 
Mexican state to be born.43 
 
requirements. The consistency of legal order is preserved, therefore, even in case officials exercise 
power in ways that violate higher-order legal norms. Kelsen himself describes the doctrine, with 
respect to a judicial decision applying a statute to a particular case, as follows: 
The statute does not provide simply that the judicial decision [ . . . ] should be created in a 
certain way and have a certain content; it also provides, alternatively, that even an individual 
norm created in another way or having another content should be valid until it is overturned, 
in a certain procedure, on the basis of its conflict with the first provision of the statute. Once 
the procedure is exhausted, or if no appropriate procedure is provided for at all, then the 
doctrine of finality applies, and the force of law accrues to the lower-level norm as against 
the higher-level norm. This means that the lower-level norm, notwithstanding the fact that its 
content runs counter to the higher-level norm, remains valid—indeed, it remains valid owing 
to a principle established by the higher-level norm itself, namely, the doctrine of finality. 
It seems hard to avoid the conclusion that Kelsen is in effect saying that those who are authorized 
to take any legal decision have the power freely to choose to either apply the law or to decide 
according to their personal discretion. The claim that the state cannot act illegally, hence, would be 
trivially true. And this trivial truth would do little more than to mask an unfettered discretionary 
regime of those who wield the powers of the state. 
Id. at 78–79 (alteration in original) (quoting HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL 
THEORY (Bonnie Litschewsky-Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans. & ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1934)). 
 40 See Speckman Guerra, supra note 18, at 226. 
 41 Hernández Franco, supra note 20. 
 42 Vargas, supra note 16, at 1345. 
 43 In the 1800s, however, these ideas had to be viewed through a lens of Mexican history. Napoleon had 
taken over Spain, and therefore Mexicans of Spanish heritage no longer felt allegiance to new Spain. They 
formed coalitions with the indigenous populations to overthrow the new Spanish (French) rule. They adopted 
secular conventions of law in order to avoid the natural right of kings as appointed by God to rule the people. 
By the time Kelsen’s ideas came along, the Spanish (French) rule of Napoleon was over. The Mexican 
aristocracy had then adopted secular ideologies of law that eschewed natural law, but maintained an 
understanding of law that law served the state, not the individual. 
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The drafters of the Constitution of 1917 picked their words carefully in 
order to distinguish the new constitution from the natural-law based 
constitutions born out of Enlightenment philosophy.44 The Constitution of 
1917 did not grant rights to individuals to be protected from the state, but 
instead the state warranted to the individuals the way it would treat its 
citizens.45 The power to define the community’s values was given to the 
state.46 The logic of its power structure, with the constitution ultimately serving 
the state, was taken from Kelsen.47 The state could thus suspend the 
constitution when its ends were endangered.48 Courts, as arms of the state, 
were means for the suspension of rights of the individual.49 
Mexican lawyers and judges have resisted shifts to an oral adversarial 
system, in part because they see it as being based on a natural law/fundamental 
rights jurisprudence that rejects Mexican jurisprudence and history. In 
addition, they may resist the implications of an oral adversarial system on their 
roles in the justice system. 
What, then, are the jurisprudential assumptions in an oral adversarial 
system? 
B. The Scottish “Common Sense” School and Enlightenment “Liberalism” 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a school of philosophy 
grounded in active interactions between people blossomed in Scotland.50 
Thomas Reid, a professor of philosophy at the University of Glasgow, became 
a leading authority in this movement, which came to be referred to as the 
School of Common Sense.51 Reid and his contemporaries envisioned a 
philosophy that contrasted with some of the idealistic excesses supported by 
 
 44 See Fernando Yllanes Ramos, The Social Rights Enshrined in the Mexican Constitution of 1917, 96 
INT’L LAB. REV. 590, 599 (1967). 
 45 The original Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 stated in part “every individual will enjoy 
the guarantees granted by this Constitution.” CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS 
[CONST.], as amended, art. I Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) (translated by 
the authors). 
 46 See generally id.  
 47 PURE THEORY OF LAW, supra note 26, at 221. 
 48 Id. at 273–74. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Daniel Walker Howe, Why the Scottish Enlightenment Was Useful to the Framers of the American 
Constitution, 31 COMP. STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 572, 574–80 (1989). 
 51 Biography of Thomas Reid, UNIV. GLASGOW, http://www.universitystory.gla.ac.uk/biography/?id= 
WH0019&type=P (last visited May 5, 2012).  
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philosophers such as John Locke and David Hume.52 While Locke and Hume 
argued that the human mind is fundamentally shaped by a person’s impressions 
and perceptions and does not possess traits independent of these occurrences,53 
Reid advocated that humans retain a divinely created innate set of principles 
that serve as the starting point for intellectual activity.54 According to Reid, 
humans are affirmative actors in their own destiny and do not simply react to 
phenomena from the outside world.55 This philosophical approach—developed 
as Scotland grappled with nation-building problems such as unification, 
economic development, and religious conflict—proved popular among 
America’s founding fathers, as the United States found itself tackling similar 
issues as the eighteenth century drew to a close.56 Many of these common 
sense principles guide U.S. jurisprudence today, especially concerning the 
jury’s role in the adjudicatory process and evidence law’s assumptions about 
the admissibility of character evidence.57 
Simply put, U.S. law assumes that jurors are best at applying their common 
sense to make findings of fact concerning what happened and the intent of 
defendants based on witness testimony and the evidence that is presented.58 
What is the relationship between these assumptions and the Scottish 
philosopher Reid? Reid viewed “first principles” as the starting point for 
human interactions, but Reid also advocated a more general framework that 
presupposed that people share certain attributes prior to beginning their 
relationships.59 In An Inquiry into the Human Mind, Reid focused on the 
importance of a shared, natural language in writing that there can be “no 
compact or agreement without signs, not without language; and therefore there 
must be a natural language before any artificial language can be invented.”60 In 
addition to the natural language of signs, other such “first principles” 
continued to highlight certain truths as self-evident and fundamental to human 
 
 52 See generally DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739). 
 53 See generally id.  
 54 THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS OF MAN 8–16 (1788) [hereinafter ACTIVE POWERS]. 
 55 THOMAS REID, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN 12 (J. Bell, 1785) [hereinafter 
INTELLECTUAL POWERS]. 
 56 See Howe, supra note 50, at 580–83. 
 57 Daniel D. Blinka, Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 357, 400 (2010). 
 58 See id. at 380–81. 
 59 THOMAS REID, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN MIND 93 (5th ed. 1801). 
 60 Id. 
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intellect.61 These “first principles” encompass the common human experience, 
and therefore, according to Reid, they should serve as a foundation from which 
to embark on philosophical inquiry. 
After assuming these “first principles” to be true, Reid argued that humans 
could then engage in affirmative acts of communication that moved beyond 
mere perceptions and impressions delivered by the senses, as discussed by 
Hume and Locke.62 Reid viewed the human mind as an active player in 
mankind’s interactions, writing that,  
the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being. . . . [I]t 
implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of 
thinking are called its operations is, that in all, or in most of them, it 
is not merely passive, as body is, but is really and properly active.63 
Reid particularly emphasized the role that judgment played in formulating 
human thought. Reid viewed judgment as part of the formation of an idea that 
also requires approving or negating some aspect of that idea.64 For example, 
Reid wrote that for a person to conceive of an idea (X), the person must first 
determine what (X) is and then distinguish (X) from all other ideas that are not 
(X).65 By this active process, humans form judgments based on their own 
interactions and knowledge.66 In witnessing the active judgments made by 
humans during their interactions with each other, Reid equated philosophy 
with the natural sciences.67 Just as a scientist observes nature in determining 
the accuracy of his hypothesis and formulating general truths, Reid called on 
philosophers to watch the actual judgments that people make in forming 
associations and to generalize sociological principles from these active 
decisions.68 
While Common Sense School philosophers attempted to use human 
common experience as a basis for subsequent knowledge, positivist 
philosophers, such as Kelsen, emphasized the hierarchical structure of rules 
 
 61 These “first principles” included Reid’s view that fellow men engaging in conversations with each 
other each have life and intelligence, that conscious thoughts are the thoughts of a distinct being called 
“myself,” and that “it is impossible to reason with someone who has no principles in common with you.” 
INTELLECTUAL POWERS, supra note 55, at 36, 581. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 5. 
 64 Id. at 318. 
 65 See id. at 318–19. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 ACTIVE POWERS, supra note 54, at 13. 
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and norms.69 Kelsen argued that human social acts become norms if the acts 
were achieved in accordance with other norms existing within the same rule of 
law framework.70 Although Kelsen’s positivism focused on the concept of 
authority as emanating from a state’s structural hierarchy, Reid’s model opts to 
avoid emphasizing authority; instead, he centers his analysis on the social 
operation involving two people.71 In Reid’s view, the social operation would 
be valid simply because the communicators understood that certain social acts 
conveyed as part of the exchange possessed social meanings.72 
In summary, Reid bases the formation of new social rules on the exchange 
between two active participants—persons who came into the exchange already 
having satisfied his “first principles.” This approach differs from the passive 
model based on impressions and expressions that came before Scottish 
Enlightenment, and also deviates from the positivist school, advocated by 
Kelsen, which emphasized that new norms could only be formed if they were 
in accordance with existing rules. 
The Common Sense School provided the underlying assumptions for much 
of the U.S. oral adversarial system.73 It supported assumptions that witnesses 
could use their perceptions to “record” memories.74 Like a video camera, the 
memory will most accurately display the witness’s perceptions if they are 
delivered orally before a jury.75 The performance should be live.76 Testimony 
should be largely extemporaneous responses to open-ended questions posed by 
the lawyers. Too much rehearsal will make the witness’s testimony stale and 
flat.77 One important question for the jury is how closely the witness’s 
narrative testimony matches the recorded memories and in turn how accurately 
those memories reflect what the witness saw in the first place.78 Leading 
questions are generally not permitted on direct, though on cross-examinations, 
leading questions are permitted to test the witness’s testimony and determine 
the witness’s sincerity.79 All of these procedures then flow from the “common 
 
 69 The Pure Theory of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 7, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
lawphil-theory.  
 70 Id. 
 71 See INTELLECTUAL POWERS, supra note 55, 72–74 (chapter on social operations of mind). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Blinka, supra note 57, at 370–71. 
 74 Id. at 379. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 380. 
 77 Id. at 381. 
 78 Id. at 379–80. 
 79 Id. at 381. 
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sense” assumptions of how one knows what happened, how it happened, and 
why it happened.80 
An oral adversarial system puts value on the dialogue between persons as a 
mechanism for understanding how best to resolve conflicts. Mexico’s move to 
an oral adversarial system assumes that there is a need for live witness 
testimony to take the place of a predominantly written system. Mexican 
reformers must acknowledge the value changes inherent in this shift in order to 
deal with the natural resistance of the positivist system, which will resist the 
“common sense” first principles of dialogue. 
Mexico’s decision to embrace an oral advocacy system may mean rejection 
of old processes that view the authority of the law as existing in state 
enactments, which includes the very act of judicial decision-making. Instead, 
the dialogue between opponents, and with the court, is essentially a decision 
for the “finding” of facts and the law to emerge from the adversarial process. 
Not only does the court make law, but the court also applies the law to facts 
determined by the presentations of evidence. The new system assumes the 
judge can find facts not only based on what the witness says, but also on the 
way the witness testifies in court. The demeanor of the witness is crucial to 
determining the credibility of the witness. Any inconsistencies in the way she 
testifies in court and her earlier statements will help bring transparency to the 
fact-finding process. Cross-examination will be a key way to test a witness’s 
veracity. In addition, the oral system assumes that once the facts are 
determined, the court will be more bound to apply existing laws to the facts 
and use reason to reach more consistent and just results. 
II. CHOICES INVOLVED IN CHANGING MEXICO’S CRIMINAL, PROCEDURAL, 
AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW 
To understand how the changes to the Mexican Constitution and code of 
criminal procedure will impact the advocacy skills the prosecutors and defense 
lawyers will need, this Part looks at the present criminal trial system. Then, 
this Part describes the changes mandated by the constitutional reforms. This 
Part argues that the principles of transparency and due process may require a 
different method for presenting evidence, which will have implications for the 
ethical roles required of the advocates, as well as opening statements, direct 
 
 80 Id. at 362; see also Mason Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 
CORNELL L. REV. 239, 240 (1967). 
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and cross-examinations, impeachment, admission of exhibits, and closing 
arguments. In other words, a shift to an oral adversarial system rejects the 
jurisprudence of positivism, and puts its faith instead in the ability of judges to 
discern facts based on evidence presented by live witnesses and tested by 
cross-examination and argument. 
A. The Present System: A Written System 
Mexican lawyers come out of a legal tradition that is skeptical of oral 
advocacy.81 The Mexican legal system specifically abolished the requirement 
for a popular jury in criminal cases.82 Even where oral advocates debate and 
respond to each other, the Mexican traditionalists worried that the more skillful 
or more powerful would end up abusing the rule of law rather than upholding 
it. Concerned that courts would be overly influenced by emotional rhetoric and 
thus misled rather than ethically persuaded to do the right thing, a file-based or 
written system has been used for many years. Very simply, the present system 
depends on the police working with a prosecutor. The prosecutor then is tasked 
with gathering all relevant evidence—both for the prosecution and for the 
defense—and then putting that evidence in a written form. All of this written 
evidence then is placed into a file for the judge to read and then decide the 
case. As a result, witness testimony was turned into written statements. 
Exhibits were tested by the prosecutor before they were put in the file. Any 
disputes were handled by the secretariat, who made the determination of what 
would get in the file. The judge might hear from the witnesses, but only to 
confirm the testimony they gave in their statements, and cross-examination 
was narrowly limited by facts already contained in the file.83 
B. Positivism in Mexico’s Criminal Law 
Positivism also affected Mexico’s criminal law. As Elisa Speckman 
Guerra’s research indicates, in the period from 1871 to 1929, positivism 
affected the way that Mexican courts viewed criminal defendants.84 Seeing 
 
 81 Oral trials were actually included in Mexican state constitutions in the nineteenth century. Armando 
Enrique Cruz Covarrubias & Jose Barragan Barragan, Los Juicios Orales en la Constitucion de 1812 y en la 
Constitucionalismo Local Mexicano [Oral Trials in the Constitution of 1812 and in Local Mexican 
Consitutionalism], 39 ARS IURIS 63, 90–103 (2008) (Mex.) (on file with authors). 
 82 Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Is Mexico Ready for a Jury Trial? Comparative Analysis of Lay Justice Systems 
in Mexico, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Ireland, 2 MEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009). 
 83 See generally Sarre & Perlin, supra note 2. In addition, the Authors have visited criminal courts in 
Mexico City and directly observed these procedures. 
 84 Speckman Guerra, supra note 18, at 231–35. 
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individuals as a combination of physical personality (temperament) and 
psychological personality (character), the positivists viewed the individual as 
governed by a combination of internal factors and the environment; in any 
event, the individual was driven by other factors beyond his will. Criminals 
were classified as either “born criminals,” or “perpetrators of crimes of 
passion,” or “random criminals.”85 Sentences were harshest on the “born 
criminals.”86 
As Mexican criminal law evolved in the 1920s and 1930s, the judge was 
given more and more discretion to make sure the punishment fit the crime.87 
Criminals who committed crimes of passion and random crimes did not 
deserve the same punishment as born criminals.88 As a result, judges were 
tasked with gathering information (evidence) of the character of the defendant 
from whatever source they could.89 Was their conduct that of a born criminal? 
If so, then there was no use in attempting to rehabilitate the defendant. Such 
criminals needed to be removed from the community in prison camps for as 
long as possible. 
As a result, the judge is given wide latitude to gather evidence that relates 
to the character of the defendant.90 The Mexican judge is accustomed to 
entering a trial knowing all about the defendant’s background, family, criminal 
record, and earlier brushes with the law.91 Much of this “evidence” is based on 
hearsay, documents and statements contained in the written file, before it is 
admitted into formal evidence. The question for the Mexican reformers is how 
much of this evidence must be subject to oral presentation. Moreover, how will 
the judge protect himself from the bias that such information may cause in 
making a determination of facts in the subject proceeding? If a move to an oral 
adversarial system will entail a new, more restricted role for the judge as fact-
finder, then the Mexican criminal law’s assumptions about the nature of 
criminal acts and the concomitant punishments that should be accorded, will 
need to also be reformed. 
 
 85 Id. at 234. 
 86 See id. 
 87 Id. at 237. 
 88 See id. at 234. 
 89 Id. at 237. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See id. at 225. 
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C. Changes in Mexico’s Criminal Procedure 
The Mexican Congress passed reforms that implement new oral adversarial 
proceedings that try to incorporate criminal procedure rules that define terms 
related to asset forfeiture.92 However, a number of problems arise. Since the 
judge is also the trier of fact,93 the illegally searched-for evidence comes to the 
judge. The judge must often hear about the evidence in order to determine if it 
has been illegally seized. The prejudice to the defendant by combining judge 
and fact-finder is problematic. How can the judge not be affected by the 
evidence illegally obtained in reaching his verdict? 
Judges in bench trials in the United States also act as fact-finders. Yet, they 
live in a system that helps them identify problems with illegally seized or 
prejudicial evidence, so they are attuned to the prejudicial effects and 
disciplined to make distinctions between facts and law to preserve the record 
for appeal. Mexico faces the challenge of training judges to be aware of 
criminal procedure and evidence considerations in making findings of fact in a 
setting where judges are used to blurring such distinctions. The question for the 
Mexican judiciary is what role concepts of due process and fundamental rights 
against coerced confession, confrontation of witnesses, rights against illegal 
searches and seizures, and right to counsel will effect what kind of evidence 
the judge can consider in determining guilt or innocence. 
D. Professional Responsibility Considerations 
Under current ethics rules in place in Mexico, lawyers are not restricted 
from suborning perjury.94 An oral adversarial system partly depends on the 
new role of defense counsel. The new system will rely, in part, on the integrity 
of the lawyers—that lawyers will not knowingly enter false testimony to the 
court, either in writing or through witnesses. 
Additionally, if the Mexican legal system continues to give credence to its 
concerns about the vices of oral advocacy, constraints will necessarily have to 
be placed on the advocate in a number of ways: the oral advocacy 
presentations will need to be constrained by ethical rules, and constraints will 
 
 92 MATTHEW C. INGRAM & DAVID A. SHIRK, JUDICIAL REFORM IN MEXICO: TOWARD A NEW CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 8–9, 15–16 (2010), available at http://catcher.sandiego.edu/items/peacestudies/2010-
IngraShirk-JRM%20(2).pdf. 
 93 Boris Kozolchyk & Martin L. Ziontz, A Negligence Action in Mexico: An Introduction to the 
Application of Mexican Law in the United States, 7 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 11 (1989). 
 94 Sarre & Perlin, supra note 2, at 383. 
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need to be placed on the kind of evidence the advocate can present before a 
judge. Mexican lawyers need to confront the value changes inherent in the 
switch to an oral adversarial system. This means that legal educators will have 
to describe the constraints placed on the advocate by the ethical rules and the 
common law adversarial process and by a healthy and vital evidence law. 
Educators in the law reform will have to explain how the Mexican system will 
need to adopt similar rules. They will do this to show how the Mexican bar 
might work to develop professional customs limiting the excesses of an 
unrestrained adversarial system. The educators will have to convince the 
trainee of the dangers of unrestrained advocacy—advocacy that does not play 
by any rules, that takes “cheap” shots, that is permissive of lies or allows for 
the presentation of false evidence, or unchallenged and exaggerated facts. 
III.  CULTURAL AND VALUES CHOICES INVOLVED IN CHANGING TO AN ORAL 
ADVERSARIAL ADVOCACY SYSTEM 
As the Mexican bar and judiciary considers how or whether to change the 
way evidence will be presented in court in the light of the principles of oral 
advocacy, it must make its decisions with an understanding of two somewhat 
paradoxical cultural beliefs that undergird oral adversarial systems. The first 
comes from both a widely shared skepticism that religion and science can 
provide the “truth” about what has happened in the past and that, instead, 
“common sense” and life experience provide the best foundation for making 
factual determinations in court.95 The second belief is a modern adaptation of 
the ancient wisdom based on Aristotle’s classic, Rhetoric,96 and is the 
foundation for understanding what role an advocate plays in an oral adversarial 
system.97 The presentation of cases by adversaries provides for judicial 
transparency and ensures that no salient fact is overlooked, toward the end that 
justice is done. However, it cannot ultimately guard against the human non-
rational nature of fact-finding. Fact-finding in court will often be based on the 
 
 95 Blinka, supra note 57, at 368–70. Blinka attributes common law reliance on “common sense” to the 
nineteenth-century Scottish jurisprudence adopted by England and the United States. This common sense 
epistemology is markedly different from the German view of judicial fact-finding, which is based on 
assumptions about human reason and its scientific positivistic epistemology. But such a deductionist theory 
masks its unscientific and irrational foundation, attributing to judges epistemological powers of fact-finding 
that they “must have” but have no greater foundation for possessing than any human being has the ability to 
measure whether a witness is telling the truth. For further discussion of Kelsen and the Scottish common sense 
school, see supra Part I.  
 96 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (George A. Kennedy ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991).  
 97 Rhetorical principles, however, are dependent on a number of non-rational premises, which include the 
character of the speaker and the unbiased nature of the listener.  
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judge’s own perspectives and limited by time and resources to what evidence 
can be found and presented. 
For the reform to be truly successful, educators will need to educate not 
only to build skills capacities in the advocate, but also to educate them in the 
values and character traits that advocates will need to fill the advocacy roles 
demanded of them. There is a normative aspect to the teaching of oral 
advocacy that cannot be overlooked. As we have seen in our earlier discussion 
of the Common Sense School, the oral adversarial system rests on 
epistemological assumptions as to the ability of a judge to make findings of 
fact based on principles of intuition and common sense. Common sense is 
believed to be adequate to the task because we rely upon it in our daily lives. 
Therefore, it is important to determine what beliefs are foundational in 
Mexico’s taking up an oral adversarial system. 
Our common sense leads us to believe that a witness can accurately 
perceive an event through the witness’s five senses, that the witness can recall 
the event when later testifying, that the witness’s words can accurately 
describe his or her memory, and that the witness’s sincerity can be judged 
during the recounting of the memory. When evidence is presented that lacks 
one or two of these principles—like whether the witness is sincerely recalling 
the event he or she is recalling from memory—then the fact-finders will have 
common sense doubts about the validity of evidence. These common sense 
principles are at the heart of an oral adversarial system. 
On the other hand, as good as a fact-finder’s common sense may be, 
principles of rhetoric point out how non-rational the fact-finder may be, and 
how, ultimately, a finding of fact relies heavily on faith in the skilled rhetorical 
presentations of at least two perspectives most intimately involved in a dispute. 
Rhetorical principles teach that advocacy occupies the heart of anyone trying 
to persuade another to a particular cause or point of view and forms the 
foundation of what it means to be a good citizen. Obviously, its teachings 
apply to any lawyer who speaks on behalf of his or her client and the client’s 
goals. The advocate is the client’s champion, not just in courts of law, but in 
the marketplace and to the public. 
The rhetorical skills the advocate needs are timeless and rely on his 
character as a good citizen. As Aristotle wrote in Rhetoric, the effective 
advocate has the following skills and abilities: (1) integrity; (2) the use of 
logic, employing syllogisms, juxtaposition, and multifaceted reasoning; (3) 
empathizing deeply with all sides of an argument to present balanced and fair 
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arguments; (4) anticipating counter arguments and strategizing her 
presentations and rebuttal to lead the audience to a place where they will feel 
“at home,” or comfortable in seeing things the way the advocate intends them 
to see them; and finally, (5) employing emotion or passion (not too much and 
not too little) to move the audience to do what is right.98 These criteria are 
believed to not only undergird the success of a system of justice, but also 
ensure the integrity, competence, and professional reputation of the individual 
advocate. For many years, most liberal arts educational institutions around the 
world required at least one course in classical rhetoric.99 While these 
requirements have been dropped by many universities’ modern required 
curricula, the importance of the subject is nonetheless believed to be vital to 
the well-educated lawyer. 
Like Aristotle, teachers of advocacy have long understood the limits of 
logic and reasoning, and the role of the “heart” in effective advocacy. A good 
argument persuades, and persuasion needs to anticipate both the audience’s 
“better selves”—the audience’s values, deeply held beliefs in justice, and hope 
for a more compassionate world—and their “bad sides,” described as the 
audience’s biases and prejudices, and what role each of these may play in 
shaping a favorable outcome for a client. 
This last point is especially important for the Mexican trial lawyer to 
understand about the new system.100 An oral adversarial system is structured to 
try to “unbias” the court by requiring two zealous presentations of the facts. In 
addition, it seeks to prohibit biasing evidence from being presented before a 
judicial proceeding, which could cause the judge to make up his or her mind 
before the hearing even starts. Evidence presented out of the presence of the 
defendant, without confrontation, objection, or challenge to its relevance and 
reliability is now thought to be partly to blame for the failing of a written 
system.101 A “written” system, where evidence comes to the court in a file 
 
 98 See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 96; Paul Mark Sandler et al., Classical Rhetoric and the Modern 
Trial Lawyer, LITIGATION, Winter 2010, at 16–20.  
 99 David M. Stock, Educating for Democracy: Reviving Rhetoric in the General Education Curriculum 
(Dec. 2005) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Brigham Young University), available at http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/ 
cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/471.  
 100 Maria Elena Leguizamo Ferrer, Fed. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Dist., Los Principios Acustario y de 
Oralidad en los Juicios Relativos a los Delitos de Delincuencia Organizada [The Accusatory and Orality 
Principles in Trials Relating to Organized Crime], Address at Emory University School of Law’s Conference: 
Rule of Law Reform and the Drug Trade: Challenges and Implications in Mexico and the U.S. (Sept. 30, 
2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BW7iE25S3nU. 
 101 Id. 
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ahead of the hearing, does not allow for transparent testing of the evidence to 
determine if the court has decided the case on the law, or on political, 
economic, or even corrupt bases. 
Much of what has developed as the gospel for advocates—and is put forth 
in this Article as principles for oral advocacy—comes out of a lawyer’s 
experience advocating before an audience that has heard evidence for the first 
time in court.102 In other words, the principles come from the common law: the 
experience advocating in front of juries adjudicating criminal and civil 
cases.103 Much of what has been learned regarding rhetoric does not seem 
directly applicable in the Mexican setting. Yet Mexican judges are asked to 
play a new role as transparent adjudicators of the facts. As fact-finders, they 
have enormous power and discretion when it comes to deciding the weight 
given to different facts. Nonetheless, the skills used in jury trials will be of 
paramount importance for Mexican advocates when helping courts in their 
fact-finding role. 
A challenge for Mexican judges in this fact-finding role is that they, too, 
are human beings. As fact-finders, like their U.S. counterparts, they will have 
to guard against the way status differences may lead to faulty results. They 
must not have a jury made up of the defendant’s peers to help them. They will 
have to self-insure against being blinded by their own class experiences or 
prejudices to miss what justice dictates. They must guard against the important 
contextual setting that makes the strict adherence to the law unjust and 
oppressive. They must worry that their technical adherence to legal precedent 
or legislative enactments might be colored or biased by the moneyed interests 
of the rich and powerful, and lacking in basic compassion and empathy.104 So, 
while governed by law, they know that they are often asked to decide facts 
based on incomplete proof, and restrictions placed on the advocates and their 
clients by time and finite resources. The ideal of syllogistic reasoning, or 
decisions based solely on logic, is seldom attainable. It is in these settings that 
judges and administrators need skilled advocates to point out the limitations of 
proof and logic, realizing that even though pragmatic realism requires that 
decisions be made, they must take the time to open themselves up to the 
lawyers’ oral persuasion to ensure they do not miss important counter facts and 
arguments. The court will welcome persuasion that pays careful attention to 
 
 102 See JAMES W. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY 1–3 (1975). See generally ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF 
THE TRIAL (1999). 
 103 Id. at 73–102 (chapter on the trial’s constitutive rules). 
 104 Id. 
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proof, facts, and evidence, but will also make appeals to the most basic tools of 
just decision-making: common sense, fairness, and analogies teaching the 
community values of right and wrong, and good and evil. 
Mexican lawyers will need to appreciate how the modern world has placed 
added stresses on the techniques of lawyer advocacy. No technique is more 
important than capturing the decision-maker’s attention. The decision-maker 
receives so many messages from so many actors in the market and must 
process them in so little time.105 The decision-maker may find that she does not 
have the time for logical proof or evidence, and she must make decisions 
largely in a vacuum and on instinct.106 
These constraints on time and the need for speed increase the importance 
on the advocate’s choices in selecting tools of persuasion to achieve the 
client’s goals. The client will only trust the advocate with his message if he is 
assured the advocate has the skills commensurate with the task. The client 
knows he will have to place a significant amount of discretion in the hands of 
the advocate to convey his message in a moment’s time. 
In a world where the line between ethical advocacy, advertising, and 
politics is increasingly blurred, the pressure to win at all costs can become 
overwhelming. In these days of image advertising, creating the “buzz,” and 
negative political campaigning, examples abound of “successful” persuasion, 
at least in the short run, which operate through veiled appeals to the “dark 
side” of humanity—racism, fear, and prejudice. One only need look to 
examples of modern-day politics, or in the extreme, to the Nazis’ use of the 
media to persuade107 or to the elite Hutu’s use of Rwandan radio to incite 
genocide,108 to see the dangers in unconstrained persuasive speech. This type 
of speech is designed to incite violence, discrimination, or judicial decision-
making not based on fairness and reason. 
 
 105 With the increased number of messages, it follows that there is a marked decrease in the average 
amount of attention any one message can be given; there must also be a marked decrease in the attention span 
of the listener, consumer, or decision-maker. 
 106 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 97–104 (2011) (explaining the presence of some 
intuitive judgments). 
 107 Laura R. Palmer, A Very Clear and Present Danger: Hate Speech, Media Reform, and Post-conflict 
Democratization in Kosovo, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 179, 197–98 (2001). 
 108 Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 628, 630–36 (1997); accord id. at 631 (Hutu radio “broadcasts would identify and criticize an 
individual, and . . . groups would set out at once to find and attack the person named”). 
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Educators should expect some resistance to these principles. Some Mexican 
judges and lawyers may feel that the search for the “truth” is passé, even naïve. 
U.S. legal education itself sends this message, as legal educators hold up clever 
deconstructions of the law.109 Consequently, the skill of deconstruction takes 
precedence even over any “search for truth,” effectively depriving the law of 
any ethical or moral content or meaning and denying that the true facts can 
ever be known. Perception is often more important than fact and the facts are 
said to be what one makes of them. Power is available for those who will take 
it, and the market rewards those willing to push the envelope and take extreme 
positions. 
To both Mexican and U.S. lawyers, spin can become more important than 
objective truth. You spin your facts, the opponent spins back. Then you spin 
their spin. The advocate’s ability to persuade and win trumps everything. 
Advocacy can seem to place a higher premium on what you can get away with 
than on playing fair, in making money than in making it honestly, in power 
more than character, and in moving an audience by fear and suspicion rather 
than by fairness, mercy, love, and compassion. 
How should trainers respond to these objections? What does it mean for a 
lawyer to be a client’s advocate in a postmodern age? This is an age that 
doubts the cognizability of objective truth, that is expert at deconstructing what 
has happened in the past, and that is expert in the use of rhetorical devices like 
juxtaposition, narrative, visuals, and illusion. For the lawyer whose ethic is 
only constrained by his client’s ability to pay for results, it is easy to worry less 
about integrity, and the legal process becomes merely the means by which the 
ends are obtained. For lawyers today, it is easy to question whether it is better 
to have integrity or to have success. Is it better to produce a useful product and 
sell it at a fair price or to sell a cheap, useless product, take the money, and 
run? Is it better to run an honest campaign that discusses the issues or to say 
what it takes to win? Is it better to play by the rules or to get your client off for 
a crime he committed? 
To answer these questions, the educator will need to remind the trainee of 
the first principle of Aristotelian rhetoric: effective advocacy depends on the 
integrity and character of the person who is the advocate. Once society stops 
crediting the lawyer with any sense of professional integrity, the lawyer’s 
rhetoric becomes unpersuasive. Hence, what appears to be the economically 
 
 109 See generally ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009). 
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expedient choice has long-term professional, and thus, economic, 
consequences for the advocate. 
Nonetheless, one could ask, “Who really cares? Who really cares that 
everyone is so selfish and self-centered?” It turns out it is the advocate herself 
who may care the most. The advocate is the client’s advisor. The advocate is 
not the client’s serf. What gives the advocate’s life’s work its meaning and 
indeed its joy, is not the win, but that the work is done honestly, with integrity, 
and according to the rules of justice and fair play. Ultimately, this course of 
study tries to guarantee the reputation of the advocate and validate, from an 
economic perspective, the rationale of the approach. 
At least in the situation of the oral advocate and lawyer, these assumptions 
operate powerfully to limit the excesses of the postmodern thinking about the 
non-objectivity of facts and the impossibility of the search for truth. Training 
must highlight the normative limits of what advocates can say and do. Where 
these assumptions are violated, the society reacts and rebels. These 
assumptions are vital to the integrity of the adversarial system, and it is 
important to be reminded of them to help guide the Mexican officials currently 
grappling with the reform of their adversarial system.110 
 
 110 The common law adversarial system works well if the advocate not only understands the system’s 
workings and her role in the process but also understands how to resist the pressures of cheating and winning 
at all costs. Make no mistake, the advocate must advocate zealously. On the other hand, she must not present 
false evidence and may never lie on behalf of a client. 
The system works because the adversaries present competing stories for the decision-maker’s 
consideration. The system works because the judge or referee tests the admissibility of evidence and exercises 
his or her discretion to make sure that the excesses of advocacy are constrained. The system, though, depends 
on the integrity of the advocate and her understanding that she may not advocate a position she knows to be 
false or take a position merely to harass, annoy, injure, or delay the process. 
One wonders whether Mexican legal educators will take the position that, despite the trial process’s 
constraints and limitations, the truth is at least approximated in a well-designed advocacy system in which a 
lawyer acts with integrity and within the rules during the trial process. Will they share a belief in the system’s 
epistemology, or way of discerning what is true and what is fair from what is a lie and what is unjust? Will 
they adopt a belief that an unbiased group of individuals, or at least a group of professional judges who are 
aware of their biases and apply themselves to their task out of a sense of public duty to do what is right, can 
make just decisions? This audience of decision-makers, whether making up a court or a jury, must be assisted 
to think comprehensively about their decision, and explore fully what can be said on all sides. Then, if made 
up of well-meaning, caring people, trying to do the right thing, they will pool their experience, practical 
wisdom, and moral intuitions and make “right” decisions, or at least do as well at getting it right as any other 
system known to humankind. 
The advocacy system depends on a vigorous presentation of evidence by parties who have a real stake 
in the outcome, and these vigorous and competitive presentations are necessary for the decision-makers to take 
a comprehensive and considered look at the dispute. Zealous presentations ensure that parties are truly heard, 
even where the matter is routine or uninteresting, or where one of the parties is unlikable, unpopular, or has 
little status. Zealous advocacy ensures that the freedom and autonomy of the individual client is maximized, 
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The challenge, then, to the long-term viability of the Mexican oral 
adversarial system, will be instilling a shared sense of values in the judges and 
the advocates that will simultaneously preserve the benefits of zealous 
representation and limit the excesses of oral advocacy. One nongovernmental 
resource to support character and fitness development in Mexican lawyers 
might come from the Mexican bar associations. These bar associations could 
take the lead in professional education and ethics to instill the values inherent 
in an adversarial system. Such organizations can take the long view about the 
need for integrity both in the lawyer and in the judiciary. Ideally, the bar 
associations will be joined by Mexican law schools in the ongoing task of 
instilling the character and values necessary to the integrity of the advocacy 
system. Training institutes—made up of legal educators, judges, and lawyers 
who develop materials and program designs that pay attention to both skills 
and values—will be necessary and vital to the success of oral advocacy 
reforms.111 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING AN ORAL ADVERSARIAL ADVOCACY SYSTEM 
TO MEXICAN TRIALS 
As we have seen, Mexican law reform education will help define what oral 
advocacy is in Mexico and its relationship to the way evidence is presented and 
 
even in the face of societal pressure to conform and cooperate. This role is important because society is better 
off when its processes for justice are less concerned with efficiency and more concerned that the decision-
maker hears all that needs to be said in favor of each side and when its processes place the burden of 
discrediting on the opposition through the discovery processes. These beliefs and values, deeply embedded in 
the adversary system, are inherent in both the civil law and the common law. They are also deeply embedded 
in the market and the value placed on an efficient market governed by informed and rational consumer 
choices. 
At the same time, the adversary and market systems’ processes do depend on playing fair. Just like a 
scientist who falsifies research or fails to follow fundamental scientific principles harms the scientific 
community, the rule of law is harmed where the individual lawyer fails to follow the rules. Lawyers must 
understand the limitations that are imposed on their persuasion by the rules of evidence. Obviously, the 
advocate cannot falsify evidence. He cannot make up things or state or allude to facts without a good faith 
basis to believe those facts are true. Even where the hearing is not being conducted according to rules of 
evidence, the advocate must understand why hearsay is so dangerous and why arguing irrelevant facts or 
submitting evidence of prior bad acts that do not relate to truth or veracity is distracting at best and unfair and 
inflammatory at worst. Even when the message is made to the market, that message can be the basis for 
lawsuits for consumer fraud, for securities fraud on the market, or for trading on inside information. What is 
said on behalf of the client cannot ignore the facts or effects on the market that those statements may bring 
about. 
 111 For example, Instituto Panamericano de Estudios Procesales (Panamerican Institute for the Study of 
Procedure, “IPAEP”) was created to carry out this mission in Mexico. IPAEP is a division within the law 
school at the Mexico campus of Universidad Panamericana. Instituto Panamericano de Estudios Procesales, 
UNIVERSIDAD PANAMERICANA, http://www.up.edu.mx/document.aspx?doc=28973 (last visited May 5, 2012).  
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the values that will need to be instilled in the advocates to constrain against the 
excesses of those presentations. To further explore the challenges reformers 
will face, we must be reminded of how the written system works. As every 
lawyer in Mexico knows, the written accusatorial system depends on the 
following: before trial, a prosecutor objectively investigating the case brings 
witnesses to give written statements to the secretariat.112 The secretariat edits 
these oral statements into a typed summary of what the witness has to say. The 
secretariat also audits the taking of the statements, to keep out irrelevant 
evidence and evidence that is without foundation. The witnesses then appear in 
court at a hearing only to confirm those statements to a judge. The statements 
are not hearsay. They are the evidence, and oral additions will be prohibited if 
facts were not raised earlier in the statements, other statements, or documents. 
While the constitution provides for confrontation and cross-examination in 
court, this ability to confront is strictly limited by what is already in the file.113 
Under an accusatorial system, the battle over proof is shaped by what facts 
and details get into the file. Lawyers can examine the witnesses about their 
statements, but can only do so to contradict opposing witnesses if they have 
produced written statements to the secretariat that raise contradictory facts. In 
other words, it will be natural for Mexican trial lawyers to precede every 
question with a phrase like, “It says in your statement, or in the statement of X, 
or in Exhibit 5, it says that . . . . Is that true?” 
One important question for Mexico is whether an oral adversarial system 
will be based on the right of a defendant in a criminal case to confront 
witnesses against him. Under an oral adversarial system where the defendant 
has a right to confront a witness in court where a fact-finder is present, the 
witness’s out-of-court statements are not allowed in court, in the first instance. 
The court will not allow the statements to be referred to, and instead the 
statements will be viewed as hearsay, unless there is some rule or exception 
that would allow their use. Hearsay, an out-of-court statement offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted,114 is prohibited based at least in part on the 
unreliability of out-of-court statements and in part on the right of defendants to 
confront witnesses against them. 
 
 112 This description of the present system is supported by the personal observations of the Authors in 
courts in Mexico and interviews with Mexican judges, lawyers, and law professors. See also Sarre & Perlin, 
supra note 2, at 372–89. 
 113 Id. 
 114 FED. R. EVID. 801. 
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If an oral adversarial system incorporates the right of the defendant to be 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and also incorporates evidentiary 
prohibitions against illegally seized evidence, hearsay, and evidence that 
violates a defendant’s confrontation rights, then Mexico’s view of an 
adversarial hearing will have to change dramatically. As a result, the 
defendant’s lawyer would need to be present when statements are taken, 
including the submission of exhibits and statements of experts, or there would 
be a constitutional implication. Objections made by counsel on the basis that 
there is no foundation or that the statements are not in evidence would be 
sustained or the court would be violating the defendant’s right to an oral 
adversarial process. 
If and when these changes are introduced in Mexico, advocacy teachers and 
students of oral advocacy must understand that, under the Mexican reforms, 
the court will no longer be able to read statements but will instead hear the 
evidence for the first time through the testimony of witnesses. Direct 
examination must be thought of in a whole new way. Cross-examination will 
also become more important to the hearing. Without cross-examination, the 
judge will face difficulties in learning about the inconsistencies or biases in 
what the witness is saying as compared to statements they may have given 
earlier. If referring to statements without their introduction is objectionable 
under the new system, the cross-examiner will need to control the witness to 
keep the witness from repeating the witness’s direct testimony. 
The need for oral testimony will affect the role of the advocate throughout 
the trial. In sum, the change to an oral adversarial system will affect the 
lawyers’ skill sets. In an oral advocacy setting, the courts will need to hear 
opening statements and closing arguments, and lawyers will need to conduct 
direct examinations, cross-examinations, impeachments, and to offer exhibits. 
In other words, the new role played by the Mexican judge now presiding over 
the presentation of oral evidence will make new demands on the Mexican 
advocate. 
A. Changes to Presenting Evidence in Court 
The right of the criminal defendant to confrontation is at the heart of the 
oral adversarial system and significantly changes the ways that evidence will 
be presented in court. The burden of proof will remain on the state.115 These 
 
 115 See, e.g., Criminal Cases, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/federalcourts/understandingthefederal 
courts/howcourtswork/CriminalCases.aspx (last visited May 5, 2012).  
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changes imply that no longer will it be good enough for the state to collect 
evidence, put it in a file, and give it to a judge. The state will need to present 
evidence to the court in an oral format, permitting the defendant to challenge 
the admissibility of the evidence and the witness who is its source. 
Mexican prosecutors will also need to present the evidence in a way that 
will give the judge a chance to assess the credibility of the witness. The 
prosecutors will likely have to avoid two extremes in the way they question 
witnesses on direct examination. First, they will have to avoid leading the 
witness by asking questions that are unduly suggestive of the answer that will 
be given.116 Second, they will have to avoid vague or overly broad questions or 
questions that call the witness into a narrative, not giving the opposing 
advocate the chance to object to irrelevant evidence117 or hearsay.118 
 
 116 FED. R. EVID. 611. 
 117 Relevance asks the relevance of the background material the prosecutor is asking about. For example, 
why is it relevant that the witness is married and has a child with mental disabilities? If the prosecutor has a 
hard time answering the question, then perhaps it should be left out of direct testimony. 
Still, the lawyer should realize that questions of background—employment, family, and experience—
are crucial for helping a fact-finder assess the credibility of the witnesses’s testimony. Mexico will likely adopt 
a relevance rule that is initially very permissive, and then is restricted where Mexico determines that certain 
evidence may be prejudicial. Relevance might then be defined as anything that advances a material issue in the 
case, even in the slightest way. As defined in the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), “relevant evidence” 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. FED. R. 
EVID. 401.  
Under the FRE, relevant evidence may be excluded if it is overly prejudicial for its probative value. 
FED. R. EVID. 403. Similarly, after determining relevance, Mexico can develop special exclusionary rules for 
evidence the court determines is overly prejudicial for its probative value or is a matter of character evidence 
in criminal cases and so may prejudice the court. The court could be prejudiced to make a decision not based 
on the state’s proof in this case, but based on the past bad acts the defendant committed. Of course, these are 
matters the direct examiner will want to exclude and so will not present in her direct examination. We will 
have to talk more about these exclusions when we talk about constraints for the cross-examiner.  
If the attorney can keep the court from ever hearing about a prior bad act on cross, then there is no need 
to deal with it defensively. Can the attorney convince the court that it must be careful to try the defendant only 
on the state’s evidence presented in this case and that it must be careful not to twice punish someone for 
crimes done in the past? After all, the burden is on the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Criminal Cases, supra note 116. So, for example, in the United States, the court does not even admit (and so 
does not consider) prior misconduct of the defendant, and it is very careful to exclude from its consideration 
evidence of most criminal acts, if overly prejudicial. Judges will need to be sensitive to these changes because 
they are different from what Mexican law required of them in the past. 
To help attorneys see how this works, they should review: (1) FRE 404, which forbids using prior bad 
acts to prove an action in conformity therewith; (2) FRE 608, which allows character and prior bad acts in 
certain narrow circumstances; and (3) FRE 608, which allows evidence of felony convictions. FED. R. EVID. 
404, 608. Counsel in Mexico might make a motion to a pretrial judge to exclude this kind of evidence from 
being presented to the judge trying the case.  
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1. Changes to Direct Examination 
On direct examination, if the court has not had the benefit of notice of the 
statements before hearing the witnesses, the witnesses must be “directed” in 
their testimony. The court will rely on counsel to conduct a direct examination 
that is both efficient and complete. The court will want to judge whether the 
witness is telling the truth. The court, therefore, will likely adopt a rule that 
prohibits the lawyer from putting words into his own witnesses’ mouth. The 
lawyer will be constrained to ask only non-leading questions—unless (1) the 
matter is not in dispute, (2) it is foundational to a particular evidence 
foundation, or (3) it helps “develop the witness’s testimony”119 or speed it 
along. 
 
 118 As to police officers on stakeouts or other investigators, attorneys may have a reliability problem 
because the witnesses’ testimony is based on what someone else told the officer or investigator. In oral 
adversarial jurisdictions, this reliability problem is called hearsay and is based in part on the defendant’s 
constitutional right to confront witnesses in court. Reliance on out-of-court testimony by witnesses not present 
for the court to judge their credibility and not subject to cross-examination is objectionable because it is 
“hearsay.” FED. R. EVID. 801, 802. 
On the other hand, the police or investigators are tempted to use hearsay to explain why the witness 
was at the scene or in position to witness something. Otherwise, the court might think the police was just “out 
to get” the defendant. (The officer may have received complaints, or the defendant may be a notorious crook.) 
How will a prosecutor ask the question to explain why the officer was there without violating hearsay? Is the 
prosecutor offering it for the truth of the matter asserted (FRE 801(c)) or to explain why he was at the scene? 
Should you ask a leading question to avoid unduly prejudicing the fact-finder? FED. R. EVID. 803. The 
prosecutor might ask that the witness limit his answer to yes or no, thereby excluding evidence whose 
prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. For example the prosecutor might ask, “As a result of 
being directed by your superiors, where did you go to set up your stakeout?” The attorney could remove the 
hearsay objection and unfair prejudice by asking, “Were you directed to the scene as a result of information 
you received from authorities in your office?” 
Will the witness offer evidence of conversations (either about what they said, or what someone else 
said) that occurred out of court that will be offered for the truth of the matter asserted? Most adversarial 
systems allow for some exceptions. For example, is your witness expected to give evidence of an admission of 
a party (like that allowed in the United States under FRE 801(d)(2) and therefore not hearsay)? FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2). Or is it offered as an exception in the evidence law? If so, the attorney must determine what 
exceptions he or she will rely on. In the United States, FRE 803 includes exceptions for: (1) present sense 
impression, (2) excited utterance, (3) state of mind, (4) statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or 
treatment, (5) recorded recollection, (6) records of a regularly conducted (business) activity, and others. FED. 
R. EVID. 803. FRE 804 includes hearsay exceptions for situations in which the declarant is unavailable for: 
(b)(1) former testimony, (b)(2) dying declaration, and (b)(3) statement against interest. FRE 807 is a catchall, 
with prior notice to the other side. FED. R. EVID. 804, 807. 
Attorneys should also determine whether they will ask the court to take judicial notice of any fact, 
because the facts are so widely considered true in a given community. FED. R. EVID. 201. For example, the 
time it gets dark during a certain time of year or the weather conditions that were present at the time an event 
was observed are the sort of facts that can be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice. 
 118 For examples, see FED. R. EVID. 201 cmt. 
 119 FED. R. EVID. 611(c). 
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To help establish witness credibility, Mexican prosecutors need to know 
how to ask open-ended questions that will give the witness a chance to speak 
in a narrative. Testimony through narrative helps the direct examiner show the 
witness’s ability to speak in detail about what the witness saw, heard, or did. 
Lawyers should not ask closed-ended questions on direct examination, because 
closed-ended questions elicit from witnesses only short answers, such as 
“Yes,” “No,” or “I don’t know.” 
It is, however, not enough for the lawyer to simply ask, “Do you confirm 
your statement you gave to the prosecutor?” Such questions do not permit the 
judge to assess the witness’s credibility from the manner in which they testify. 
The lawyer must use techniques that will highlight and give emphasis to the 
important facts the witness knows, and allow the witness to restate for the 
court what the witness previously has told the prosecutor or police. In other 
words, the lawyer will need to act like a movie director, giving the witness 
directions through the questions as to where to give more emphasis and more 
detail. On key events, the judge will need to see what happened, as if he or she 
were there, and so information about time, place, and circumstance leading up 
to the event will be important. It is likely that Mexican judges, like American 
judges, will look for the examining lawyer to use head notes, so that the 
witness is directed to topics containing important facts and so the witness 
recognizes when the lawyer is shifting the focus of the testimony to a different 
subject. 
The new oral advocacy procedures will also put more stress on the 
advocate to prepare the witness for giving testimony in court. An unschooled 
witness may need real help in this regard. In addition, the court will want the 
witness to discuss the relevant issues. For efficiency purposes, the lawyer 
should rehearse with the witness so the witness is ready to give important 
details. On the other hand, the lawyer must be careful not to tell the witness 
what to say, or lose sight of the need to present the court with truthful 
testimony. Mexico may need to adopt an ethical rule that prohibits lawyers 
from knowingly suborning perjury. The lawyer should instruct the witness to 
not knowingly present false testimony. 
The Mexican lawyers, as new students of the oral adversarial process, will 
quickly learn that witnesses get nervous and may forget things, or get facts out 
of order. It is important to explain, then, how a lawyer deals with these 
problems. The lawyer does not want to appear to doubt or contradict the 
testimony of the witness. Most importantly, the lawyer should also organize 
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the direct examination by using questions with imbedded time signals, such as 
“what did you do immediately after you were hit by the defendant?” or “what 
happened right after you saw the man take out a knife?” In other words, the 
best direct examiners will proceed in an organized fashion, proceed efficiently 
(by asking open-ended questions), and proceed to highlight important facts in 
favor of one’s client by corroborating the testimony with exhibits, and asking 
time, place, and circumstance questions to give context to the important facts. 
It is important to note, in an oral adversarial system, that the witnesses’ 
earlier statements are not in evidence, and the direct examiner should not refer 
to them. To do so would violate the confrontation rights of the opposition. The 
evidence is presented through the testimony of the witnesses in court to protect 
the defendant’s right to be present and to confront witnesses against them. 
Moreover, in its new adversarial system, the Mexican court will not have 
the traditional file, which before would have included information concerning 
a witness’s earlier criminal conduct. Following the reforms, now such conduct 
only would be put before the court if the witness “opens the door” by 
something the witness volunteers.120 Not only does the defense give up control 
during the cross, but it is also difficult to control what the client will say on the 
stand. This is because the lawyer must give up control by using open-ended 
questions in order to develop the witness’s credibility, and in so doing, the 
direct examiner risks that the witness will give short shrift to key points, will 
over-emphasize matters that are less important, will be boring, arrogant, or, in 
the worst case, even volunteer testimony that might damage the case. 
The standard direct examination is also made difficult by the artificiality of 
the rules that govern the setting. The court is trying to balance efficiency and 
fairness: efficiency by trying to ensure that the witness is given direction about 
 
 120 Mexican reformers might consider evidence code provisions like those contained in FRE 404, 405, 
608, and 609. See FED. R. EVID. 404, 405, 608, 609. However, these provisions make different assumptions 
about the unreliability of character evidence than Mexican judges are accustomed to. Consider two examples: 
FRE 609 and FRE 404. FRE 609 excludes the defendant’s past criminal convictions of similar crimes, unless 
their probative value substantially outweighs their prejudicial effects. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). This rule 
addresses fears that the fact-finder would not demand the requisite proof (proof beyond a reasonable doubt) 
where the fact-finder knows of the earlier conviction. FRE 404 bars the use of specific instances of bad 
character evidence to prove the defendant acted in conformity with such bad character in the present case. FED. 
R. EVID. 404. Mexican judges might feel they do not need to restrict such evidence because they can give such 
evidence the weight it deserves. 
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what the court will admit as relevant evidence; and fairness by trying to 
provide the witness with an opportunity to tell his or her full story.121 
2. Authenticating Documentary Evidence and Proving Its Reliability 
As to documentary evidence, the Mexican prosecutor must now account for 
the authentication of the document—whether the original is needed, whether it 
is relevant, whether it is privileged, and whether it is hearsay. Does the 
Mexican prosecutor have stipulations or admissions in place to cover these 
issues? Will the prosecutor still lay a persuasive foundation for the use of the 
documents to help explain to the fact-finder why he or she can rely on it? This 
is especially important for pictures or photos that can be Photoshopped or 
created by tricks and manipulations. 
As a result, if the Mexican attorney wants to use illustrative and 
demonstrative exhibits, the attorney should ask if a particular foundation must 
first be laid. While there is often no specific rule dealing with illustrative or 
demonstrative exhibits, the foundation for illustrative exhibits is the same as 
any witness must give before being allowed to testify: does the exhibit or 
evidence assist the fact-finder, or, instead, confuse, mislead, or waste the 
court’s time? For demonstrative exhibits, the court must think the exhibit is 
relevant and reliable and so the exhibit needs to fairly and accurately depict 
what it purports to show. 
It may become important for the lawyer to address these issues at the 
pretrial conference, so the court is not frustrated with lengthy objections, which 
 
The lawyer must ask interesting questions in a dramatic tone of voice, even though the lawyer may 
already know the answer to the questions he or she is asking. The lawyer’s task on direct examination is to 
simultaneously develop the witness’s credibility while (1) “directing” the witness to emphasize the matters that 
need emphasizing, (2) dealing with the destructive matters, and (3) efficiently managing the matters that are 
necessary but—by their nature—boring. 
Efficiency in direct examination is especially important because judicial fact-finders in jurisdictions 
using oral adversarial rules often complain about how repetitive, boring, and condescending trial lawyers are 
during direct examination. Many times, in the attempt to highlight and underscore matters, lawyers become 
redundant and repetitive, until these fact finders want to yell at them, “Okay. We got it already. Move on!” 
(British judges have a more polite way of doing just this. They say, “Hmm, I take your point, please move on.” 
In addition, British barristers check in with the court to give the court an opportunity to move them on by 
saying, “If you are with me, My Lord?” before moving on.). 
 121 Repeating the same testimony from more than one witness, even when it is left unchallenged by the 
opposition, can lead the fact-finder to think that counsel thinks he or she is stupid. As a result, lawyers in an 
adversarial system must analyze witnesses’ testimony in the light of what is in conflict, and use the persuasion 
techniques and skills described below to (1) give detail and emphasis to the important points, (2) spin or de-
emphasize weak points, and (3) move efficiently and effectively through less important matters. 
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interrupt and delay the presentation of the case. If, however, these evidentiary 
issues have not been resolved, the lawyer must prepare his direct examination 
with the evidence rules in mind. Then, if the lawyer gets an objection, he can 
respond with arguments about the reliability and relevance of the exhibits and 
testimony. 
B. Changes to Objections and Making a Record 
Mexican trial lawyers will also need to expand their understanding of how 
they must protect the record for appeal. This creates a new role for the trial 
lawyers. Aside from making objections, the trial lawyer must now also 
preserve his objections for appeal. An oral adversarial system assumes that a 
defendant—and in some cases, the prosecution—will have the right to appeal 
if the court considered unlawfully admitted evidence or misapplied the law. 
This means that the lawyers may make objections to the admissibility of 
evidence either before trial—by means of motions in limine—or at trial, at the 
moment the evidence is introduced. An oral adversarial system also assumes 
that the court keeps a record of what has been said, so that the appellate court 
can review the decisions of the lower court, both as to the court’s decision on 
the admissibility of evidence, and to the law it applied to the case. This means 
that it is incumbent on the objecting attorney to make objections on the record, 
lest the appellate court reasonably believe that the lawyer waived his objection 
to the admissibility of the evidence. Lawyers in an oral adversarial system, 
including lawyers in Mexico under the new reforms, must learn to make a 
record for appeal whenever they object to the admission of evidence, so that 
the appellate court knows the trial judge was given a chance to make the right 
ruling. 
Of course, the importance of these skills—of making and responding to 
objections, as well as preserving objections for appeal—depends on the rules 
Mexico adopts for appellate review. Will the appellate court be limited in its 
review to matters of law? Will there be a record of the trial court proceeding 
that will allow the appellate court to review evidentiary matters? Will the 
appellate court be able to call witnesses and second-guess credibility decisions 
of the trial court below? How the Mexican system answers these questions will 
greatly affect the skills the lawyer will need to present evidence in the trial 
court. 
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C. Cross-examination 
Cross-examination in an oral adversarial system is a time for the opposing 
lawyer to challenge and confront the witnesses that testified against his or her 
client. Again, in Mexico, where the judge has not seen witness statements 
before, this is a time for the cross-examining lawyer to challenge the witness 
with other statements or other evidence that the lawyer has a “good faith basis” 
to believe are true. Using a combination of earlier statements, the lawyer’s own 
fact investigation, and logic, the lawyer challenges the witness by putting 
forward the facts and exhibits that contradict what the witness said on direct 
examination, or show bias, lack of consistency, or lack of foundation. 
With regard to cross-examination, courts are not interested in hearing either 
repetitions of the direct examination, or “fishing expeditions,” where the cross-
examining lawyer aimlessly asks questions in the hope that the witness will 
eventually contradict herself. As a result, courts will likely gravitate toward 
allowing cross-examining lawyers to ask leading questions, which will keep 
the witness from rehashing the direct. Leading questions allow the cross-
examining lawyer to better control the witness, and therefore to more 
efficiently get the witness to admit holes, inconsistencies, or bias that may 
have affected the witness’s testimony. For more on cross-examination, see 
Chapter IV of Oral Trial Advocacy: A Normative Approach.122 
In addition, where the witness’s statements are not in evidence, the cross-
examiner will need to use inconsistent statements to highlight mistakes, 
changes, or lies that the witness is telling the court. Impeachment by 
inconsistent statement avoids the hearsay use of the earlier statement, because 
the earlier statement is not offered for the truth of the earlier assertion, but to 
attack the credibility of the witness’s testimony in court.123 
D. Closing Arguments 
Finally, presenting closing arguments will now also be important for the 
Mexican advocate. Closing arguments are important opportunities to review 
the evidence each side has presented and argue the fair inferences that can be 
drawn from the evidence. The advocate should show the court the match 
between the law and the evidence, or lack of evidence. The court should also 
 
 122 PAUL J. ZWIER ET AL., ORAL TRIAL ADVOCACY: A NORMATIVE APPROACH (Mex. ed. 2012) 
(forthcoming summer 2012) (manuscript at 93–112) (on file with authors). 
 123 Id. (manuscript at 120–51). 
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be shown the reliability or unreliability of the evidence presented using (1) 
evidence law, (2) points of impeachment, (3) burden of proof requirements, 
and (4) arguments about the credibility, bias, or unreliability of the witnesses’ 
testimony or the documents presented. Where the court has received 
documents, the court will be greatly aided by arguments that draw the court to 
specific facts contained in these documents and how they relate to proof or 
lack of proof.124 
The good news is that these new roles can be taught using learning-by-
doing methods that have been used in the United States and in a variety of 
international law reform contexts. The key here is for the participants to 
experience the new roles they will play in the new system. By experiencing the 
new methods for conducting direct and cross-examination, making objections, 
doing impeachment, and preparing and presenting opening statements and 
closing arguments, Mexican trial lawyers can gain an understanding of how the 
system works, confidence, public speaking skills, and leadership capacities 
necessary for successful advocacy under the new system. 
CONCLUSION 
Mexican educators must overcome a number of challenges in order for 
Mexico to meet its 2016 deadline for implementing changes to an oral 
adversarial system. Assuming that there is political will to implement the 
changes and sufficient buy-in to an oral adversarial system, these educators 
will have to teach the lawyers and judges about the new system. To be 
successful in their educational project, they will need to overcome resistance 
from the Mexican bar to the need for reform. The requirements of an oral 
adversarial system will necessitate changes in the way the Mexican bar will see 
its jurisprudence. The system implicates changes for its criminal law and 
procedure. An oral advocacy system based in part on the rhetorical skills of the 
lawyers implicates cultural and value changes. In addition, the new system 
implicates the role traditionally played by judges, and will have practical 
implications on the way trials will be conducted. 
Mexican reformers and educators must be able to both give respect to the 
past legal system, and at the same time, advocate for a fundamental shift in an 
understanding of the Grundnorm of the law. The law ultimately resides in the 
 
 124 Id. (manuscript at 268–306). 
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shared experience, language, and dialogue of the individuals before the court, 
rather than in the pronouncements of the state. 
Legal educators will next need to overcome resistance to change that comes 
from shifting to an oral advocacy process from a process that depends on the 
compilation and reading of a file prepared for the court to decide the case. 
Legal educators will need to explain the role that lawyers play in keeping the 
fact-finder from information that will create unfair prejudice or bias against 
one of the parties. As a result, they will have to explain the biasing effects of 
character evidence and hearsay and explain a pretrial motion practice that will 
protect the court from consideration of this kind of evidence. 
To succeed in making the transition to an oral adversarial tradition, the 
bench and bar will need to embrace the cultural values inherent in a system 
dependent on rhetoric. They must understand the assumptions made by an 
adversarial system: good decisions depend on a zealous presentation by 
opposing sides. Advocates not only test the evidence presented by the 
opposing party, but challenge the court to better see how its institutional 
perspectives can blind it to vital facts necessary to reach fair and just results. 
Moreover, the new role of rhetorical skills will rest on integrity of the advocate 
to constrain the excesses of advocacy. New ethical constraints will be needed 
to make sure that the new system does not replace the lack of transparency 
inherent in a written system, with a lack of transparency brought about by the 
clever deceits of the advocate. 
Finally, the educational endeavor will succeed if educators use learning-by-
doing techniques designed to have the trainees both experience the confidence 
and public speaking skills through oral advocacy training, and understand the 
reasoning behind the oral adversarial method. 
The lessons learned in Mexico are applicable to legal reform efforts around 
the world. As countries like Mexico make changes to their legal systems, there 
is good reason to look to the systems and experiences of other countries. In 
doing so, however, a country must carefully consider fundamental 
philosophical differences between systems. Those assisting in the reforms must 
also understand the differences in the way a society views both crime and the 
criminal. Adopting an oral adversarial system will also have implications for 
cultural beliefs and values in the way that decisions are made, and the 
constraints to be placed on those who make them. Finally, for rule of law 
reform to take hold, reformers will need to understand that it will not be 
enough to simply change the law of the books or the procedures used in court. 
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Experiential learning and capacity building will be key to true ownership and 
implementation of any changes to an oral adversarial system. 
 
